Using data from the Failed State Task Force data set, this paper argues entering onto positive growth paths for income and infrastructure per capita depend upon a nation's political stability and its geography. A nation's achieving sustained long-run growth in both variables is essential to its capacity to converge towards countries with high levels of income per capita because high levels of per capita infrastructure are strongly correlated with high levels of income per capita. New nation states seem to face heavy burdens to avoiding negative feedback traps, partly because their youthfulness is associated with political stability; partly because their propinquity to other politically unstable neighbors hampers their capacity to grow through trade and their ability to avert domestic conflict; partly because they tend to be located in the tropics where the incidence of malaria is high.
Modern growth theory with its emphasis on convergence -the idea that poor countries with a low capital-labor ratio should grow faster in terms of income per capita than wealthy countries because the marginal product and marginal return on capital is higher the lower the capital-labor ratio -flourished in this environment.
In its early heyday the literature stressed the importance of a key aggregate demand variable fashionable in the Keynesian theory of the day, the savings rate. Savings per worker in excess of that necessary to tool the new entrants to the labor force and depreciation on existing capital stock, leads to capital deepening (a rise in the capitallabor ratio). The mainstream models developed along these lines argued population growth tended to stymie rapid growth in income per capita, pointing out the greater the rate of population growth, the greater the need to plow new investment into capital widening keeping the capital-labor ratio constant.
In sum, ushering from the rudimentary growth theory were some simple rules:
increase capital formation in the new nation state (either by bolstering domestic savings through the creation of a network of banks backed up by a national central bank or domestic equity markets or through loans or direct aid from foreign sources); discourage population growth, by promoting population planning programs and fertility reduction.
The simple growth theory models of the 1950s and 1960s were not greeted with unrestrained enthusiasm in all academic and policy-making circles. Dissenters abounded.
Economists with a Marxist or non-neoclassical bent were skeptical by the optimizing assumptions underlying the modeling. Many political scientists concerned with the difficulties of nation building encountered by the former colonies and territorial possessions of England, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Japan, and the United States,
were understandably skeptical about the relevance of policies advocated by the neoclassical theorists. Political realists noted that the one party rule -riddled through and through by self interested diversion of foreign aid and government controlled revenues into the pockets of dictators and their obsequious henchmen feeding off the rake-off going into the coffers of the powerful -was an unfortunate concomitant of the new nation state building.
[1]
The record of growth in per capita income in nation states new and old after The argument of this paper is that convergence is conditional on the political stability and geographic characteristics of nation states. Political and geographic characteristics are interwoven, shaping the capacity of nation states to successfully build physical infrastructure that supports long-run economic development.
The logic of the argument can be easily grasped with some simple algebra.
Consider the following variables (1) gpini = f (pini, gy, sr, apg, polstab) and (2) gy = g(yini, sr, apg, polstab, geo)
Where I assume that the impacts of the independent variables in equation (1) are:
negative for pini (reflecting the convergence hypothesis), positive for gy (the more rapidly income per capita grows the greater is the growth of resources that can be used for building more physical infrastructure), positive for the savings rate sr, negative for population growth (population widening cutting into the growth of capital deepening) and positive for political stability. For equation (2) I assume that the impacts of the independent variables upon gy are as follows: negative for yini (the convergence hypothesis); positive for sr, negative for apg, and positive for polstab. Finally, I assume that impacts of the proxies for geographical constraints depend upon the particular variables that I use in the analysis.
Several points relevant to the recent literature in this field are worthy of mention:
it is assumed that geography and political stability interact in shaping nation state building and the perpetuation of nation states, neither dominating one another [3] ; and it is assumed that there is mutual feedback from per capita income growth to growth in infrastructure, so that countries tend to either move along positive growth paths or become mired in negative feedback "traps." [4] The conditionality imposed by geography and political stability is crucial to determining which path nation states have taken in the post-World War II period.
What is political stability? In this account, the degree of political stability is viewed as running along a continuum, ranging from highly stable to highly unstable, civil wars and domestic political crises tantamount to civil conflict characterizing unstable regimes. [5] To empirically capture the impact of political stability upon long-run income per capita and infrastructure growth, one requires a data set that has within its purview wide variations in political stability. This study uses the Failed State Task Force and The Polity IV Political Regime data sets assembled by team of political scientists to derive measures of political stability in so far as it impacts national level economic behavior.
[6]
One of the assumptions governing this study is that nation building comes at a price. Talent that could otherwise go into private sector economic activity is diverted to creating and staffing the political institutions crucial to creating national banking systems, national roads and common carriers, national currencies, and educational systems that create a polity conducive to creating political consensus. In low-income countries that have short national histories, creating viable nation states can be very costly indeed. But what is to be done? There is a huge economic penalty for not creating the political stability required to guarantee the survival of the nation state. That is the thrust of the findings reported here that emphasize the conditionality of the political stability of the nation state for determining the probability that a country enters onto a virtuous growth path as opposed to falling into a negative feedback trap.
[7] Table A .1 and elsewhere in the empirical core of this paper.
II
In Appendix Of the 28 countries in which "yes" is less than or equal to 1, 18 countries (64.3%) experienced strongly negative consequences to falling into crisis. By "strongly negative"
I mean that the growth rate during the crisis period(s) were below the growth rates during the non-crisis years, and the percentage of years with negative income per capita growth were greater during the crisis period(s) than during the non-crisis years. Another 5 countries had "somewhat negative" experiences during the crisis period(s), one of the two conditions noted immediately above (below average growth or a relatively high proportion of negative growth years during crises) being met. Finally, in 5 cases, neither negative condition occurred. Thus in newly formed countries, crises usually but do not always produce negative economic consequences.
However, if we restrict our attention to countries experiencing complex crises (in which at least two separate types of crises are occurring simultaneously), the incidence of negative economic consequence is considerably higher than it is in countries experiencing some form of "failed state" crisis. There are 13 countries with "yes" less than or equal to 1 experiencing at least one complex crisis. For this group, 11 (84.6%) experienced "strongly negative" economic consequences; 1 had a "somewhat negative"
experience; and 1 avoided negative consequences altogether.
In the older country group (with "yes" greater than 1) -counting Pakistan twicethere are 32 countries. Of these 32 countries, 17 (54.8%) experienced "strongly negative"
consequences to falling into political crisis; 6 experienced "somewhat negative"
consequences; and 8 experienced no negative economic consequences (India is excluded from these allocations as it was classified as being in political crisis throughout the period . Within this group of countries, 17 experienced at least one complex crisis.
Of the sub-group saddled with at least one complex crisis, 12 (66.7%) experienced "strongly negative" consequences; 4 experienced "somewhat negative" consequences;
and 2 did not experience negative consequences.
From these findings we can draw several conclusions: most, but not all, periods of political crisis yield negative economic consequences that are felt immediately during the period of the crisis; and young countries (with "yes" less than or equal to 1) tend to be more likely to experience "serious negative" consequences to falling into political crisis than older countries; and complex crises are unusually bad as far as economic growth is concerned.
In interpreting these results concerning young and old countries something should be said about the correlates of "yes:" after all, it is possible that the "yes" variable is picking up influences due to its correlates. Working from the list of variables in Appendix Older states tend to be more urban; tend to be in Europe and the Western hemisphere; tend to have higher per capita income and more infrastructure per capita than newer states; tend to have slower population growth and higher rates of savings perhaps reflecting a deeper financial infrastructure; and tend to low incidence rates for malaria. It is likely that the ability to avoid falling into negative economic growth during political crises enjoyed by older countries is partly due to the existence of these correlations.
III Infrastructure and Income per Capita in the Failed State Task Force Sample
The thesis of this paper is that entering on a virtuous long-run growth path requires channeling sustained income per capita increases into sustained growth in infrastructure, particularly physical infrastructure.
Why focus on physical infrastructure? Two reasons seem to be compelling: there is synergy in developing all forms of infrastructure, creating human capital enhancing infrastructure that bolsters educational and health capacity of populations depending on the domestic level of communications and transportation in a country; there is strong comprehensive international convergence in many development indicators, including those for the human development, but there is a lack of comprehensive convergence in income per capita and in per capita physical infrastructure. [8] In this regard consider the cross-section relationships between the level of infrastructure per capita and income per capita at the beginning and end of the period considered in this study (the early period is typically 1955-59; the later period is typically 1991-95). These cross-sections appear in Figures 1 and 2. [ Figures 1 and 2 about here].
The correspondence between the two variables is readily evident from the figures (the correlation between the two variables is +.82 in the early period).
While the association between levels of physical infrastructure and levels of income per capita is strong, indicative of a strong connection between long-run infrastructure buildup and the capacity to generate income year after year, the association between growth in per capita infrastructure and growth in per capita income per capita is far weaker. This is evident from It is also a matter of the way political voice is exercised. For instance, the correlation between pva (the polity variable) and per capita infrastructure is +.46. In political environments where the voices of all regions of a nation are heard through the political process, the authorities controlling budgets for infrastructure creation and maintenance are more likely to feel pressure that keeps them from exclusively allocating resources to a few favored sites.
In sum, experiencing sustained growth in income per capita is essential to building infrastructure. This said, it is difficult to deepen the per capita infrastructure supply of countries where the population is widely dispersed, or conditions of political unrest leading to civil war in the worse case stymie the political process of allocating public resources to building, maintaining and regulating infrastructure stocks.
IV Convergence in Infrastructure per Capita and Income per Capita: The

Importance of Political Stability and Geography in the Failed State Task Force
Data Set
In this section we report on regressions that follow the format laid out in equations (1) Table 1 it is evident that the sign on the pini variable in the regression with gpini as dependent variable is negative; from Panel B of the table it is evident that the sign on the yin variable is negative. Again, the economic variables in Panel A behave as expected:
population growth has a negative impact; income growth a positive impact; and the savings rate a positive impact. Interestingly, the impact of "big government" on growth in infrastructure -the share of government in the economy multiplied by the polity variable -is negative. The inference is that the public sector has the most beneficial impact on infrastructure when it operates in a "lean and mean" manner, perhaps limiting its interventions to regulating infrastructure rather than in building it.
In the Panel B regression the most striking results concern the impact of geography -the presence of malaria risks throughout a country at all times of the year is a clear drag on growth -and the pull of being in Asia as far as the pull of trade is concerned. Of course what we are calling geography may not be geographic pure and simple. Malaria tends to a rural disease; its incidence may be increased when civil wars force the refugees without natural immunity to malaria fleeing conflicts to move into regions where they are vulnerable; Asia is a region with strong pull through trade due to the existence of regional sparkplugs like Japan. So one must be careful to not overinterpret the geography variable.
V Conclusions
This paper argues that entering onto virtuous growth paths for income per capita and infrastructure per capita depends on both political stability and geography. A nation's achieving sustained long-run growth in both variables is essential to its capacity to converge towards countries with high levels of income per capita because high levels of infrastructure per capita are strongly correlated with high levels of income per capita.
Recently emergent nation states seem to face heavy barriers to entering onto virtuous growth paths. One of these barriers is their youthfulness that is associated with political instability. Another is their propinquity to other politically unstable and economically stagnant neighbors that hampers their capacity to promote growth through trade and their ability to avoid domestic conflict. A third barrier to entering onto a virtuous growth path is the incidence of malaria that seems to stymie growth in income per capita throughout much of the tropics where many of the relatively new nation states are located. per worker in terms of social infrastructure, the amount due to variation in the capital-labor ratio and the quality of labor input being remarkably small.
[2] For a full list of the variable names used in the empirical analysis appearing later in this paper, please see Appendix Table A.2. [3] In interpreting international cross-sections in income per capita scholars like Jeffrey Sachs emphasize the overwhelming importance of geography while others stress how political and economic institutions dominate. For instance Sachs and Warner (1997) emphasize being in the tropics and being landlocked, and Gallup and Sachs (2001) stress the negative impact that the incidence of malaria has upon growth in income per capita. In contrast, Hall and Jones (1999) and Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) place priority to political institutions, especially on the spread of democracy and the franchise in which voting is done in private. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) argue that geography -especially the incidence of parasitic diseases like malaria and yellow fever in the tropics -constrained
Europeans who were desirous of settling the colonies that they secured during the th century. Countries to which European settlers flocked -for instance, Australia -developed the political and economic institutions that promoted virtuous income per capita growth while countries settlers avoided tended to develop political and economic institutions that were not conducive to virtuous growth. The emphasis is on historical persistence. In this paper, geographic constraints are viewed as facilitating or hindering the development of national institutions -that is the institutions of nation building -in the contemporary period, and less emphasis is placed on historical persistence. For an interesting economist perspective on the nation-state, see Alesina and Spolaore (2003) .
[4] Feedback, either positive or negative, is crucial to arguments about path dependence, namely the view that the deadweight of the past shapes the choices made in the present. In Mosk (1996) Project IV data set, see Marshall and Jaggers (2002) . For the income per capita (and population growth, savings and share of government in the economy figures used in this study) see Heston, Summers and Aten (downloaded on January 14, 2005) . For the figures on physical infrastructure per capita, see Canning (1998) .
[7]
In the analysis undertaken here, only domestic wars are taken into account, international conflicts being excluded from the data set. This assumption rests in part on the fact that in the post-1950 period, the frequency of civil wars has increased relative to the frequency of international conflicts. In fact, there is often an overlap of domestic and international tensions, particularly in countries where ethnic or religious groups live on both sides of a international border separating nation states. On this point see Davis, Jaggers and Moore (1997) .
[8] On these points see Goldin (1998) and Kenny (2004) . Gramlich (1994) provides a useful discussion of the literature measuring the growth payoff to infrastructure investment. (1956-66; 1975-92; 1977-98 (1) Revolutionary wars -episodes of sustained violent conflict between organization and politically organized challengers that seek to overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or seize power in one region.
(2) Ethnic wars -episodes of sustained violent conflict in which national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities challenge governments to seek major changes in status.
(3) Adverse regime changes -major, abrupt shifts in patterns of governance, including state collapse, periods of severe elite or regime instability, and shifts away from democracy toward authoritarian rule.
(4) Genocides and politicides -sustained policies by states or their agents, or, in civil wars, by either of the contending authorities that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal or political group. 
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